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[I]nstead of being viewed as a rival [foreign capital] ought to be
considered as the most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put in
motion a greater portion of useful enterprise than would exist
without it.'
The economic realities facing the United States during the
1790's compelled it to entice foreign investment.2 In an attempt to
stimulate the economy, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Ham-
ilton lured foreign investors with what is known today as the "open
door policy." Basically this policy allows for an influx of foreign
capital by insuring that only minimal restrictions are placed on for-
eign investment.' While this policy may have been well suited to
the economy of the 1790's, it is questionable whether the policy
should be continued into the 1980's. Today, foreign investment
continues at a rapid rate, even though it is no longer necessary for
the growth of the United States economy.
This investment is largely attributable to: the new wealth of
the Middle East nations,4 the depreciation of the dollar in interna-
tional monetary markets5 and foreign investment restrictions im-
1. L. Hacker, Foreign Investment in America's Growth 5 (U.S. Information Service,
1967). Quotationfoundin Elmer and Johnson, Legal Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S.
Corporations, 30 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 681, 698 (1975).
2. SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 95th CONG.,
2D SESS., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND 45 (Comm. Print
1979) (paper by W. Wendell Fletcher and Kenneth A. Cook). [hereinafter cited as SENATE
COMMITTEE PRINT].
3. Reference to foreign investment hereinafter means foreign direct investment in agri-
cultural land, unless expressed to the contrary. Foreign Direct Investment is defined as: The
direct or indirect ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated
business enterprise. Also included as direct investment are purchases and development of
real property. Individual purchases of private residences are not included [for the purposes
of this paper portfolio investments will not be considered as direct investment]. Industry and
Trade Administration, (ITA Report UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NEWS,
79-138, August 23, 1979).
4. Note, U.S Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment.- Current Developments and the
Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 621-26 (1975).
5. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 26 (paper by Paul W. Barkley and
Leroy F. Rogers).
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posed by other nations. During the 1970's the United States
initiated a critical reevaluation of this open door policy, with spe-
cial attention being given to foreign investment in agricultural land.
The first problem encountered in considering the impact of
foreign agricultural investment was a lack of reliable data.6 No
federal statute existed which required disclosure of foreign invest-
ment.7 Further, state recording statutes were lacking in uniformity
and failed to accurately reveal the extent of such investment.
Some states have recently initiated new efforts to restrict for-
eign purchases of agricultural land.8 Other states have turned to
preexisting laws9 which have laid dormant and unenforced for
many years."0 As individual states increasingly take the perogative
to restrict foreign investment two results become apparent: State
laws lack uniformity, and if a thorough review is not given to their
operation, are on a collision course with the federal open door pol-
icy.
Coinciding with the United States review of foreign agricul-
tural investment is an international trend restricting foreign acqui-
sition of agricultural land.I' Following this international trend,
and the several restrictive models embodied therein, it is suggested
that the United States adopt a joint federal-state regulation system
for foreign investment in agricultural lands. The adoption of such
a measure would insure a uniformity of approach on both the state
and federal levels. The United States would again be speaking
with one voice on the issue, while protecting the national and state
economies. Further, local regulations and state perogatives which
are already in effect, can easily be incorporated into such a system.
This Comment will examine the traditional United States open
door to foreign investment in agricultural land. Part I will define
the problem of foreign investment in agricultural land, including
the reasons for it and the possible resulting harms. Part II will ana-
lyze national and local policy decisions that have been made re-
garding foreign investment in United States agricultural land, and
6. Raymond J. Waldman, The World Gets Bullish on America, The District Lawyer,
(October/November 1979) (Vol. 4, No. 2) at 42. [hereinafter cited as Waldman].
7. SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 24-26.
8. IOWA CODE § 567.1 (1979).
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121 (1971); OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1.
10. Interestingly enough one state changed its laws to invite foreign investment, see S.C.
CODE ANN. § 57-103 (1962).
11. Weisman, Restrictions on the Acquisition of Land by Aliens, 28 AM. J. CoMp. L. 39,
39-66 (1979). [hereinafter cited as Weisman].
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their constitutional implications. Part III will deal with the policy
decisions of other nations regarding foreign investment in agricul-
tural land, while Part IV will make recommendations for new legis-
lation which would develop a uniform system for the regulation of
foreign investment in the United States. This Comment concludes
that in order to develop a uniform national policy and to bring the
United States into accord with current international developments
new federal legislation is needed.
I. THE PROBLEM OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
AGRICULTURAL LAND
Foreign investment in the United States has grown signifi-
cantly during the past three decades. The overall book value 2 of
foreign investment in the United States was $3.4 billion in 1950.13
By 1960 that figure had jumped to $6.9 billion,' 4 and by 1970 the
book value had risen to $13.3 billion.'I In 1975 this figure doubled
to $27.7 billion,' 6 and in 1978 foreign investment was estimated at
$40 billion.' 7 As a result, foreign investment has been subject to a
good deal of public attention. The response has been primarily an
emotional one due to the fact that state and federal recording legis-
lation fails to effectively monitor foreign purchases. Without an
adequate understanding of the scope of foreign investment, the leg-
islators and public are prevented from formulating a rational re-
sponse. As long as conditions which are favorable to foreign
investment continue to exist, foreign investors will invest in the
United States.
A. The Existing Concern Over Foreign Investment in
Agricultural Land
Foreign investment in agricultural land poses a problem, the
limits and severity of which cannot be determined with certainty
under existing recording procedures. Without a sound statistical
basis, the impact of foreign investment on United States agricul-
tural land cannot be fully understood. Recent congressional con-
cern over foreign investment in agricultural land led to the
12. Book value is the value of the asset less depreciation or with appreciation.
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enactment of laws designed to monitor such investment,' 8 thus
placing the federal Government in an area previously reserved for
the states. 19
The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978
(AFIDA)2 ° is one Federal response which requires foreign inves-
tors currently holding or subsequently acquiring an interest in
United States farmland to report the transaction to the Secretary of
Agriculture. 2' Though aimed at developing an accurate data base
concerning the extent of foreign investment in agricultural land, the
Act has some major flaws. First, the accuracy of the statistics ulti-
mately depends upon voluntary compliance by foreign investors
with the law.22 Second, the practical limits of policing disclosure
are obvious, as there are thousands of such transactions in numer-
ous states each year. 3 Further, if the AFIDA represents a move
toward federal legislation restricting foreign investment in agricul-
tural land, foreigners may prefer anonymity by not reporting their
investments.24 In light of revived state efforts to restrict foreign in-
vestment, investors may also seek to hide the extent of their invest-
ment to avoid state restriction. 25 Finally, some investors may not
wish to disclose their investment because it is in contravention of
the laws of their own nation limiting the outflow of capital.26 Thus,
the effectiveness of the national recording system appears limited at
best.27
State and local records provide the primary source of informa-
tion on land ownership. Unfortunately, they too are ineffective as a
18. Note, Foreign Investment, The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of
1978, 19 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1026 (1979). [hereinafter cited as The Agricultural Foreign Invest-
ment Disclosure Act of 1978].
19. H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1978).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (a).
22. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, supra note 18, at 1030.
23. The GAO study indicated that there were 13,702 transactions during an 18 month
period in 10 states. It would require a great deal of time and money to scrutinize all land
transactions in the United States. See note 33 infra.
24. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, supra note 18, at 1030.
25. Id.
26. See note 68 infra.
27. Zumbach & Hari, Anonymity and Disclosure in Ownership Recording Systems, in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE 320-22 (G. Wunderlich ed. 1976). Neither the
seller nor the buyer will have the incentive to disrupt the transaction by insisting on disclo-
sure. In addition, no cross-reference in state recording systems will provide evidence of com-
pliance with federal provisions, since all states do not require recordation of all land




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, o. 3 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
method of monitoring foreign investment.28 The primary purpose
of these recording statutes is to identify the landowner to insure
that state and local taxes are paid.29 Most of the statutes do not
require disclosure of the owners' citizenship, and those that do can
be circumvented by the beneficial owner hiding behind a record
owner. 30 Further, by delegating recording matters to the local level
a nonuniform system of laws and policing measures is created.31
The net result is inaccurate data reflecting the extent of foreign in-
vestment in agricultural land.
These inaccuracies, and speculation caused by a lack of infor-
mation, have caused an emotional response by government policy
makers and citizens toward foreign investment in agricultural
land.32 This response prompted the Comptroller General of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to conduct an indepth survey of
foreign agricultural investment. The GAO study indicated that
during an eighteen month period beginning in January 1978, for-
eign purchasers accounted for eight percent of the agricultural
purchases.33 This figure has been questioned by some who believe
this estimate is conservative because of the ineffective monitoring
devices.34
Another detailed study35 conducted contemporaneously with
the GAO study revealed that foreign purchases of agricultural land
occur at a rate of 2.25 percent of all agricultural land sales.36 This
study indicated that at that rate it would take foreign investors dec-
ades to acquire as much as one percent of all United States agricul-
tural land.3 7 More importantly, the study revealed that twenty
states accounted for ninety percent of all agricultural land transfers
to foreign investors.38 It is important to remember that the data
28. M. Frances Van Loo, The Economic Consequences of Foreign Investment in
United States Real Estate, at 30 (1979) (unpublished paper by the University of California,
Berkeley) [hereinafter cited as Van Lao].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See note 27 supra.
32. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 282.
33. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S.
AGRICULTURAL LAND--How IT SHAPES UP 4 (CED 79-114, July 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited
as GAO REPORT].
34. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, supra note 18, at 1027.
35. See SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 75-86 (Economic, Statistics, and
Cooperative Service, United States Department of Agriculture).
36. Id. at 76.
37. Id. at 81.
38. Those states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas,
Vol. 10
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base for this study was the ineffective recording legislation, which
perhaps reflects only a portion of actual foreign investment. With
effective disclosure of foreign investment, the extent of foreign
ownership and an evaluation of its potentially disruptive effect
would be more likely.
Any current study purporting to disclose the extent of foreign
investment in agricultural land will necessarily be speculative due
to the recording laws.39 Even given the lack of information on the
extent of foreign investment, policy decisions will not be resolved
by simply collecting great amounts of data suggesting foreign own-
ership of some percentage of United States agricultural land.' The
problem is a great deal more complicated. With circumstances
conducive to foreign investment, interest in the United States land
market will remain alive. Understanding the motives of foreign in-
vestors is critical to the drafting of legislation which might more
effectively monitor or restrict foreign investment.
B. Motives To Invest
The GAO study indicates several reasons why foreigners in-
vest in United States agricultural land. The most commonly cited
motive is a fundamental confidence in the political and economic
climate of the United States.4 ' Additional motives include de-
pressed stock market prices in the United States, increased liquid
4 2
monetary holdings by the OPEC nations, a depressed dollar pro-
viding foreign investors with a favorable exchange rate, rising gold
prices stimulating a search for gold substitutes, a large and homog-
enous United States market, tax advantages and the severe restric-
tions which other nations put on entering foreign capital.
43
1. Investment Security. Perhaps the major reason for in-
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Utah. Id. at 82. This concentration is bet-
ter understood when compared to the amount of farmland in the state. Thus, it would take
foreign investors 2.3 years to acquire one percent of the farmland in Oregon; 3.3 years in
Vermont and Louisiana; and 4.3 years in Georgia. Id. at 83.
39. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 19. The study did not include existing foreign
ownership because of a lack of complete data. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at
V.
40. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 38 (paper by Harold F. Breimyer).
41. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 68-69.
42. Liquidity defined: that is cash or is capable of being readily converted into cash.
WEBSTER's DICTIONARY 1318 (3d ed., 1971).
43. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 51 (paper by Stephen J. Brannon).
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
creased investment in United States agricultural land is investment
security. This security results from United States agricultural land
being a low maintenance investment choice with a long term capa-
bility of favorable returns. 44 Moreover, farmland has recently
proven to be a wise investment choice. From the Spring of 1972 to
the Spring of 1978 agricultural land prices increased, on a national
average, from $219 per acre to over $490 per acre.45 This increase
of over 124 percent, or better than 20 percent annually, was greater
than the inflation rate for the same period, and amounted to more
than increases in the Standard and Poor's Index of 500 stocks.'
Under these circumstances the open door to foreign investors
makes the land market not only accessible but very attractive to
foreign investors. When the foreign investor has a choice, he will
choose that vehicle which provides both security and a sufficient
return. Based on the performance of the stock market vis-a-vis ag-
ricultural land, the investor will favor the latter.
High quality agricultural land in Europe sells for 50 to 100
percent more than comparable United States land.47 With foreign-
ers holding increased liquid assets, a cheap dollar, and lower land
prices, the climate in the United States is conducive to foreign in-
vestment. The rationale is twofold. First, foreign investors accus-
tomed to higher land prices will seek comparable quality land
which is less expensive. Since the land prices foreign investors are
accustomed to are much higher than that which United States buy-
ers are accustomed to, foreigners will tend to stay in the market
longer than United States investors. Thus, the disparity of values
stimulates foreign investment and limits domestic investment.48
A second factor stimulating foreign investment is the opportu-
nity to accumulate large tracts of agricultural land.49 Such oppor-
tunities are more difficult in Europe.50 Approximately one billion
44. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 68.
45. Impact of Foreign Investment in Farmland- Hearings on HA 13128 and Related Bills
Before the Subcomm. on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies of the Comm.
on Agriculture House ofRepresentatives 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (June 20, 1978) (statement of
James M. Jeffords) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H. 13128].
46. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at III.
47. Id. at 12. Indeed, "[given the importance of American farmland as a renewable
resource and as a key factor in the global food economy, our farmland may well seem under-
priced from the perspective of the European investor." Id.
48. In addition to appreciation of the land between 1970 and 1977 national net farm
income totaled $170 billion. Id. at 50.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 12.
Vol. 10542
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acres of United States agricultural land is privately held.' Of that
total approximately three percent, or thirty million acres, changes
ownership annually.52 Thus, with the opportunity to acquire large
tracts of farmland, at relatively low prices, without being subject to
rigid reporting requirements, foreign investors will inevitably seek
to invest in United States agricultural land.
2. Tax Advantages. All investment motives are not based in
value differentials of agricultural land. Internationally, the United
States tax laws are viewed as the most favorable to landowners.
53
In addition, foreign investors have benefits available through spe-
cial capital gains treatment and favorable tax treaties.
5 4
For United States income tax purposes the key factor is
whether or not United States source income, derived from foreign
source investment capital, is effectively connected with a United
States trade or business. 55 The United States income tax laws call
for income effectively connected with a United States trade or busi-
ness to be taxed on a net basis.56 In the alternative, a foreign inves-
tor may elect to have income not effectively connected with a
United States trade or business taxed as if it were.57 Thus, the ef-
fective tax on income in the United States made through an invest-
ment with a foreign source is lower than an investment with a
domestic source.
58
Capital gains taxation provides additional incentives. 59 When
a foreign investor, who, for tax purposes, is effectively connected
with a United States trade or business, sells United States agricul-
tural land, the capital gain is taxed at rates applicable to United
States taxpayers.60 Foreign investors not effectively connected with
a United States trade or business may still be taxed if they make an
election.6' Capital gains not effectively connected with a United
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 39.
54. For a good discussion of these concepts see Note, Regulation of Foreign Investment
in U.S. Real Estate, 33 THE TAX LAWYER 586, 586-629 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Regula-
lion of Foreign Investment].
55. I.R.C. § 864(b).
56. I.R.C. § 871(c). Noneffectively connected income is taxed at a flat rate of 30%.
I.R.C. § 871(a), § 881(a).
57. I.R.C. § 871(d), 882(d).
58. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 32.
59. Id. at 29.
60. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1); Regulation ofForeign Investment, supra note 54, at 593.
61. I.R.C. § 871(d), 882(d).
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States trade or business are not taxed.62
The GAO study indicates that although most foreign invest-
ment in United States agricultural land is effectively connected
with a United States trade or business, or the foreign investors have
elected to have it taxed as such, foreign investors rarely incur a cap-
ital gains tax on the disposition of the property.63 This is possible
because foreign investors have developed sophisticated methods of
avoiding capital gains taxation, such as investing through real es-
tate holding companies incorporated outside the United States,
64
revoking a prior election, accepting payments on an installment ba-
sis, or exchanging agricultural land for a like kind in another coun-
try.65  These plans allow foreign investors to dispose of property
and avoid capital gains taxation since they are no longer effectively
connected with a United States trade or business.
Additional tax incentives exist in special tax treaties which al-
low avoidance of virtually all taxes.66 These tax treaties insure
lower taxation for foreign investors, the goal being to minimize tax
evasion and insure that there is no double taxation.67  These tax
treaties allow foreign investors to reduce their tax burdens by using
tax treaties between their home nation and the United States, or by
using the tax treaties of a third nation.68 The GAO recommended a
62. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1), 881. This is subject to the exception that the alien investor must
not be in the country for more than 183 days. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2).
63. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 30.
64. A mere sale of the stock in a holding company would take the investor out of the
purview of capital gains treatment. Regulation of Foreign Investment, supra note 54, at 606.
I.R.C. § 864(a)(2), 871(a).
65. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 30-31.
66. Regulation ofForeign Investment, upra note 54, at 596-606. GAO REPORT, supra
note 33, at 31-32.
67. For example, see Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, April 29, 1948,
62 Stat. 1757, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3698, T.I.A.S. No. 1855.
68. The following discussion was taken from GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 20, 31-33.
One nation that merits discussion is The Netherlands Antilles.
The Netherlands Antilles has been used to a significant degree by foreign investors. The
Antilles Treaty allows income derived from a United States trade or business to be taxed on
a net basis. Antilles also is the beneficiary of special capital gains treatment. These two
aspects of the Antilles Treaty, when coupled with provisions of Antilles corporation law,
make the Antilles an inviting channel for foreign investment.
Antilles taxes profits on business income earned in the United States by Antilles firms at
a rate of only two or three percent. Antilles also allows foreign investors to incorporate in
the Antilles and benefit from their tax treaty with the United States. Antilles corporation law
allows corporations to keep secret the identity of their shareholders. Finally, Antilles has no
estate, gift, and inheritance tax, and no capital gains tax on Antilles source income paid to
nonresidents.
These features of Antilles law encourage the use of Antilles firms as a vehicle for invest-
Vol. 10
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gradual elimination of these tax advantages.69
3. Productive Aspects. The productive aspects of United
States landownership also encourage foreign investment. The
United States has developed a sophisticated farm technology-ar-
guably the best in the world. Foreign investors may seek to invest
in the United States as a way to further develop their own technol-
ogy.7" Ownership and operation of United States farmland is con-
ducive to the acquisition of United States technology. Thus the
advanced state of technology invites foreign investment.
Foreign investors also seek to own agricultural land for its
food producing capabilities.7 The international community is de-
pendent on United States grain exports.72 The United States
learned from the Middle East oil embargo that reliance on imports
can be disruptive, and alternatives need to remain open. Similarly,
foreigners rich in oil but poor in grain may seek to mitigate grain
shortages by owning United States agricultural land.73 In this way,
reliance on international sources for foodstuffs is diminished, and
foreign investors can rely on a more stable and predictable intrana-
tional transfer. This reliance on production in the United States by
those of their own nation could be an effective hedge against the
nuances of international politics.74
4. Political Climate. The political climate in the United
States motivates foreign investment in agricultural land,7" since it is
politically and economically stable.76 Through the GAO study,
ing in the United States for several reasons. First, investors from countries with no tax treaty
with the United States may incorporate in the Antilles and benefit from lower tax rates.
Second, Antilles firms are insured taxation on a net basis in the United States. This basis
may be more favorable than the tax treaty of the investors home nation. Finally, though
some nations restrict the outflow of foreign investment capital, Antilles allows such strictures
to be circumvented. Those nations placing restrictions on outgoing capital will be defeated
in their attempts to discover investment elsewhere when confronted with Antilles law calling
for nondisclosure of investors. The GAO study indicates the largest amount of agriculture
land bought in its survey was by Antilles firms.
69. Id.
70. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 27-28.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 27; Time, January 21, 1980 at 12, col. 1.
73. Id.
74. This of course assumes the Secretary of the Treasury does not decide to "block"
transactions with foreigners pursuant to 31 C.F.R. parts 500 et. seq.; see also SENATE COM-
MITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 34.
75. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 28.
76. Id.
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
foreign investors expressed their apprehension about possible na-
tionalization or other unfavorable conditions for private ownership
in their own countries." Though necessarily assuming those who
seek refuge in the United States have sufficient resources to
purchase agricultural land, the freedom the land presents is an ad-
ditional factor motivating investment.
There are undoubtedly other motives for foreign investment in
United States agricultural land beside the ones outlined above.78 It
is important to realize that these motives, individually or collec-
tively, could make the already significant trend of foreign invest-
ment in United States agricultural land a major problem. Without
effective methods of regulating foreign investment, severe repercus-
sions may lie ahead for the United States economy.
C. The Impact of Foreign Investment in United States
Agricultural Land
Since the days of Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Dynasty,
agriculture and agricultural land have been staples of the United
States economy.79 Extensive foreign investment threatens this
traditional American agricultural system. One group that appears
particularly vulnerable is the family farmer.80 Although the total
number of family farms and the acreage controlled by them has
declined greatly, more than ninety percent of all farms remain fam-
ily farms.81 The threats to the continued existence of the family
farmer82 manifest themselves in several ways.
First, there is the issue of access to the land market. Foreign
investors with large liquid balances are able to reach agricultural
markets and provide serious competition for the family farmer.83
The successful bidders for agricultural land are those with sufficient
77. Id.
78. Those motives could include land ownership as a hedge against inflation, Id. at 27,
or as a basis for political power, id. at 5 1.
79. Hearings on HR 13128, supra note 45, at 388 (testimony by Curt Sorteberg).
Sorteberg stated Jefferson favored maximum ownership of land by freeholders and sup-
ported a diffuse system of land tenure with a maximum number of small family farmers.
Increasing concern over absentee owners may call for a reversal of the open door.
80. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 42.
81. Note, Disclosure ofForeign Direct Investment in United States Agricultural Property,
12 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 665, 667 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure ofForeign Direct In-
vestment].
82. Id. at 670-72.
83. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 42.
Vol. 10
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money or credit.84 Increasingly, young farmers are left out of the
land market as they cannot compete with foreign money. By inhib-
iting the ability of foreign investors to acquire United States agri-
cultural land the family farmer receives some protection.85
The problem is essentially as follows: As foreign capital flows
into the limited agricultural land market, demand is stimulated and
land prices rise.86 Foreign investors complicate matters as they
enter the market with a large amount of liquid assets, thus giving
them a natural bargaining advantage.87 The problem is further
complicated when large domestic agribusiness operators bid up
prices." The protection of the family farmer in this context must
be weighed against the right of the owner to sell to the highest bid-
der, 9 and problems caused by restraining free enterprise in the pri-
vate land market.90
A final problem posed to the family farmer is the separation of
ownership from operation of agricultural land. Traditionally, em-
phasis has been placed on the owner operating the land.9 The re-
turn the operator received was from his labor as a worker, manager,
and landowner.92 With land becoming more valuable as an asset,
the traditional system is jeopardized. Foreign investors often buy
agricultural land for its investment value, not its productive value.93
84. Id.
85. Id, see note 88 infra.
86. Van Loo, supra note 28, at 3-4. "Real estate markets can be characterized as having
some inflexibility in supply and, therefore, any increase in demand for existing property will
cause some increase in prices . . . Even when foreign real estate investment is small on a
national scale, its impact on local markets can be substantial."
87. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 45.
88. This problem of large agribusiness concerns has been recognized by repeated at-
tempts to limit the oligopolistic and monopolistic entities. This has been addressed in the
Family Farm Antitrust Act. See Disclosure of Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 81, at
686. See also Hearings on HR. 13128, supra note 45, at 102-03 (statement by Charles L.
Frazier).
89. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 44.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 43. The viability of the owner operated farm is threatened by the recent
downturn in commodity prices. In the short run, to maintain a level of income, it may be
necessary to replace labor with capital. As a result, only those operators who have achieved
a surplus in the parity-plus years will be able to remain in the market. Hearings on HR.
13128, supra note 45, at 410-13 (statement by Gerald M. Boyle). Where parity takes a sharp
decline, id. at 413, the smaller and less efficient operators will be forced to sell out to absentee
owners. The ultimate result will be that land may only be accessible to traditional family
farmers on a tenant basis. Id. at 410-11. With favorable tax rates and laws, foreign investors
may thus begin displacing family farmers.
92. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 43.
93. Id.
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The separation of ownership and operation demand a productive
return for each respective factor. This not only relegates the family
farmer to the role of an operator, but it also compels a multiple
return where traditionally a single return was called for.94 In addi-
tion, it increases the possibility of a foreign outflow of capital.9
The barriers that continued foreign investment creates for the
family farmer, as well as price inflation, foreign competition, and
the relegation of family farmers to tenants on agricultural land
have created trends that require examination. Further, extensive
foreign investment with concurrent land price inflation may pre-
vent some family farmers from owning agricultural land at all.
Foreign investment in agricultural land could be so great as to colo-
nize parts of the United States. 96 This possibility is greatest in the
states with minimal restrictions on foreign ownership. Indeed, with
data lacking these trends may be occurring now, necessitating a
need to update national policy.
In addition to the issue of the family farmer, foreign invest-
ment poses a threat to food production.97 The United States is a
leader in grain production98 whose crops have a certain strategic
value,99 not only as a buffer against balance of payments deficits,"
but also as an international political lever.'' As foreign investors
acquire farmland and control production, this agricultural domi-
nance may diminish. Though more effective ways to hamper agri-
cultural production exist,0 2 foreign ownership of agricultural land
could affect our dominant position.
94. Id. Thus, the investor pays the operator a salary and repatriates the profits to a
different area. Taking advantage of tax deductions that are more valuable to individuals in
higher income brackets, the investor compounds his buying power. The investment capital
will then return to further erode the traditional rural economic base. Hearings on HR
13128, supra note 45, at 411.
95. Van Loo, supra note 28, at 19-21.
96. Most modern day restrictive statutes had their genesis in response to 19th century
absentee landowners. A prime example is William Scully, an Irish landlord, who assembled
some 340 square miles of land in four Midwestern states. The land he controlled was famous
for rent collection practices and the servitude that was imposed on the occupants. SENATE
COMMImrEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 7-8; SOPHY BURNHAM, THE LANDED GENTRY: PAS-
SIONS AND PERSONALITIES INSIDE AMERICA'S PROPERTIED CLASS 138-52 (1978).
97. SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 51.
98. See note 72 supra.
99. Id.
100. Van Loo, supra note 28, at 20.
101. Witness recent economic sanctions against Russia. See Time, supra note 72, at 12,
col. 2.
102. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 54. Ostensibly control of the commodi-
ties market is a much better way to control agricultural production.
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The concentration of foreign investment in certain states is
also a problem. Without a uniform national policy restricting for-
eign investment in agricultural land, decisions restricting such in-
vestment are left to the states. 0 3 While some states have passed
restrictive statutes, others have placed only minimal restrictions on
entering foreign capital."° Foreign investors seeking to enter the
United States market will tend to invest in areas in which fewer
restrictions exist. As foreign investment is channelled into those
states, political changes may occur"' since land is traditionally a
base for political as well as economic power. As foreign land hold-
ings increase, the influence foreigners seek to exercise in domestic
politics may also increase. One form of influence may be lobbying.
Of more concern however, is the possibility that members of local
or national governments may be susceptible to influence by foreign
investors."° This view is buttressed by the fact that it has been
common practice for United States companies to use their influence
to affect the outcome of policy decisions in other countries.0 7
Indeed, this possibility of displacement of the local populace
was recognized in the policy statement of the recent Midwest Gov-
ernors Conference. 0 8 Showing concern over the rapid increase in
foreign investment, the Conference called for planning provisions
allowing "local people" to determine the ultimate use of the
land.0 9 The Conference voiced concern over the consequences of
the continued loss of agricultural land and also called for individ-
ual states to develop restrictive legislation."O
Finally, a problem is presented by the foreign investor who
owns agricultural land as an investment only, I" without regard for
its productive value. A concentration of such investors who ignore
conservation may harm the local populace." t2 The investor may
103. F. MORRISON & K. KRAUSE, STATE AND FEDERAL LEGAL REGULATION OF ALIEN
AND CORPORATE LAND OWNERSHIP AND FARM OPERATION 6-37 (Economic Research Serv-
ice, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Agriculture Economic Report No. 284, 1975) [hereinafter cited
as MORRISON & KRAUSE].
104. Id. at 73-86.
105. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 51.
106. Witness the ease of foreign influence at approaching United States Congressmen as
evidenced in the ABSCAM scandal. Time, Feb. 18, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
107. Id.
108. See Policy Statement on Non-Resident Alien Ownership of Agricultural Land and
Land Use, Midwestern Governors Conference, Osage Beach, Missouri (August 26-28, 1979).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. SENATE COMMITEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 53.
112. Id., see accompanying materials in text infra.
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buy the land as an investment only and not use it to its full utility or
be concerned about conservation. Indeed, since land values have
been appreciating, foreign investors may hold the land for its value
only, thus wasting the productive aspects. Finally, foreign investors
may want to maximize rent rather than sustain the land in its most
productive use. As such, instead of using the land to produce, the
foreign owner may rent the land. Although such an action should
be beyond question, when large scale foreign investment is con-
cerned, care needs to be taken to protect the economy. The degree
to which this is occuring is unknown in light of the limited value of
information currently existing. Although it merits discussion that
the local operators whom foreign investors hire would not let the
land go to waste, the problem still exists" 
3 and bears watching." 4
II. POLICY DECISIONS REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Increased foreign investment in United States agricultural land
has stimulated action by the government at several levels. While
national policy welcomes foreign investment, a good deal of its reg-
ulation is left to the local authorities, some of whom severely limit
foreign access."1 5 It is this two tiered and often conflicting policy
approach that needs to be eliminated.
A. Federal Laws
Traditionally the United States has maintained an open door
to foreign investment." 6 Federal law has imposed few restric-
tions,1 7 and the restrictions that have been imposed operate only
during wartime or against nations which are unlikely to be major
investors. " 
8
In keeping with the open door policy, the United States has
entered into approximately forty Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation Treaties (FCN)," 9 and has joined the Organization for Eco-
113. Id.
114. The GAO Report indicates such is not a problem, however, it is doubtful a foreign
investor would ever admit to allowing land to deteriorate. See GAO REPORT, supra note 33,
at 80-85.
115. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 37-38.
116. See Statement of the President when signing the Foreign Investment Study Act of
1974, 10 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1375 (1974).
117. MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 38-39.
118. Id.
119. See Note, The Riing Tide ofReverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate
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nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD).'.2 0 The purpose of
the bilateral FCN treaties is to regulate private and commercial af-
fairs with foreign nations.12 Although specific provisions must be
analyzed to determine the scope of rights conferred, 12 FCN trea-
ties generally provide a broad invitation to foreign investors. Simi-
larly, the multilateral OECD is aimed at eliminating barriers to
capital movement, including investment in agricultural land. 23 By
joining the OECD the United States made a public policy state-
ment in favor of an open door to foreign investment.
24
Recent concern over foreign investment in United States agri-
cultural land has initiated a federal reevaluation of foreign invest-
ment laws. Following the Middle East oil embargo of the early
1970's, the Foreign Investment Study Act (FISA) 25 was enacted.
The purpose of the FISA was to aid in the understanding of foreign
investment in the United States.' 26 The FISA gave Congress spe-
cial authorization to analyze the effect of foreign investment in ag-
ricultural land.'27 However, the FISA analysis failed to provide a
complete national picture of foreign investment. The following de-
ficiencies were noted: A lack of data on property held for personal
use; on holdings of less than 200 acres; and on land held by busi-
ness entities with total assets and revenues of less than $100,000.m28
Another major problem was a lack of effective recording statutes to
provide the FISA with an adequate data base.
129
To improve the United States' understanding of foreign invest-
ment, Congress passed the International Investment Survey Act in
1976 (IISA). 130 This statute vested authority in the Executive to
study the effects of foreign investment in the United States, as well
as United States investment in other nations.' 3' To improve the
shortcomings of the FISA, Congress granted the Executive the
power to conduct benchmark surveys of foreign investment every
120. Id. at 577-80.
121. Id. at 568.
122. Id. at 572-77.
123. Id. at 579.
124. Id. at 580.
125. Pub. L. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) note (1976).
126. Pub. L. 93-479 §§ 1-6, 88 Stat. 1450-1452, SENATE COMMITrEE PRINT, supra note 2,
at 282.
127. Pub. L. 93-479 § 5, 88 Stat. 1450, SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 283.
128. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 283.
129. See text accompanying notes 17-39 supra.
130. Pub. L. 94-472, 90 Stat. 2059, 22 U.S.C. § 3101 et. seq. (1976).
131. Pub. L. 94-472 § 2(b), 90 Stat. 2059, 22 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976).
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five years. 132 Although Congress stated the lISA was not intended
to deter foreign investment, 33 the Executive was authorized to
conduct studies determining the feasibility of monitoring foreign
investment. 134 Ineffective recording statutes again hampered effec-
tive information gathering, rendering the IISA findings incomplete.
To relieve the problem of inefficient data collection, Congress en-
acted the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act in 1978
(AFIDA). 135
The AFIDA requires any foreign person who acquires an in-
terest in United States agricultural land to report the transaction to
the Secretary of Agriculture. 36 Further, any foreign person hold-
ing an interest in agricultural land must report that interest within
180 days of the effective date of the statute. 137 The reporting re-
quirements also apply to nonforeign persons who subsequently be-
come foreign persons, 38 to corporations, 39 and to foreign investors
who convert nonagricultural land to agricultural use." ° The
AFIDA eliminates the ability of foreign investors to hide their
ownership by requiring disclosure of the beneficial owner of the
land, not just the record owner.' 4 1 In the case of corporate owner-
ship, disclosure of several tiers of ownership may be compelled to
discover the actual owner. 4 2 In an effort to encourage disclosure, a
penalty of up to twenty-five percent of the market value of the land
may be levied for nondisclosure.
43
The AFIDA is a much needed law and its operation should
disclose a good deal more foreign investment information than per-
vious procedures. The AFIDA will allow enough data to be col-
lected to give the public a better idea of the extent of foreign
investment. Finally, the AFIDA will have a nominally restrictive
effect; those who do not want their identity disclosed will not invest.
Although the Federal Government still adheres to FCN and
132. Pub. L. 94-472 § 4(b), 90 Stat. 2061, 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1976).
133. Pub. L. 94-472 § 2(c), 90 Stat. 2059, 22 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976).
134. Pub. L. 94-472 § 4(d), 90 Stat. 2062, 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1976).
135. H.R. REP. No. 95-1570, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2914, 2919-20.
136. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(a), 92 Stat. 1263, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
137. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(b), 92 Stat. 1264, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
138. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(c), 92 Stat. 1264, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
139. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(b)(3), 92 Stat. 1264, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
140. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(d), 92 Stat. 1264, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978).
141. Pub. L. 95-460 § 2(e), 92 Stat. 1264, 7 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. 1978). See also 44
Fed. Reg. 29033 (1979).
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OECD obligations, it has also enacted federal laws aimed at study-
ing and monitoring foreign investment. While the United States
government maintains an open door policy to foreign investment,
there appears to be a strong trend to the contrary. The open door
policy is further jeopardized when state laws restricting foreign in-
vestment in agricultural land are analyzed.
B. State Laws
Land law -is state law."44 The traditional role of the states in
regulating real property ownership allows individual states to ex-
periment with restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural
land. This experimentation has allowed some states to broadly re-
strict foreign investment in agricultural land while other states have
encouraged it.' 45 Those states which restrict foreign investment
stand in direct conflict with the United States open door policy.
1. Iowa. Iowa recently closed its doors to foreign inves-
tors,146 when the legislature made it unlawful for them to purchase
agricultural land. 147 Land acquired prior to the passage of the stat-
ute is exempt,148 and those foreign investors who already own agri-
culture land are simply prohibited from acquiring more.
149
Further, the statute compels a divestiture of agricultural land
within two years if the status of the purchaser changes to that of
either a nonresident alien or a foreign business. 50 It is hoped that
the effect of these restrictions and penalties will be to severely in-
hibit foreign investment in Iowa.'' As a result, speculation in
farmland should be limited.
5 2
The legislature has allowed foreigners to acquire up to 320
acres of agricultural land on the condition that they convert it to
nonfarm use within five years. Since the value of the land in a
144. MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 15. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
484 (1879).
145. See MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 16-17.
146. IOWA CODE § 567.1 et. seq. (1979).
147. IOWA CODE § 567.4(3) (1979).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. IOWA CODE § 567.7 (1979).
151. Letter from Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa and Neil D. Hamilton,
Assistant Attorney General, Farm Division to John S. Murry, Senator of Iowa (November 2,
1979) at 6 (unpublished opinion of Attorney General concerning the constitutionality of the
Nonresident Aliens Restricted from Acquiring Agriculture Land Act).
152. Id. at 19.
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nonfarm use may be considerably less than that used for agricul-
tural purposes, the cost of converting to nonfarm use may often be
prohibitive. Thus, the requirement of conversion to nonfarm use
should serve to discourage foreign investors.
The Iowa statute also limits the sale of agricultural land by one
foreign investor to another.'53 The effect of this requirement is to
force the land into the open market, thus making it more accessible
to domestic buyers. The registration and recordation requirements
will also tend to discourage foreign investors who want their iden-
tity to remain a secret 54 by requiring them to file a one time regis-
tration with the Iowa Secretary of State within either sixty days of
the purchase of the land or the effective date of the law. Annual
reports must be filed by those converting the land to a nonfarm
use.' 5 5 Finally, effective compliance is assured as the penalty of
escheat is provided if the registration and reporting requirements
are not followed. '56 This additional sanction should make the Iowa
law a more effective discovery measure than the AFIDA.
57
Access by foreign investors to agricultural land in Iowa is fur-
ther limited by a broad definition of agricultural land. In Iowa ag-
ricultural land is land "suitable for use in farming,"'5 8 and this
definition is not limited to land outside the corporate limits of mu-
nicipalities.' 59 Thus, one possible construction of this term would
include virtually all of the state, since Iowa is predominantly an
agricultural state.'60
2. Oklahoma. Oklahoma has also closed its doors to foreign
investors. In a recent controversial opinion, the Attorney General
of Oklahoma greatly limited the access of foreign investors to
Oklahoma agricultural land' 6 ' by concluding that an alien may not
153. IOWA CODE § 567.4(9) (1979).
154. IOWA CODE §§ 567.8, 567.9 (1979).
155. IOWA CODE § 567.9 (1979).
156. IOWA CODE § 567.11 (1979).
157. This is so because the potential for escheat will encourage a closer compliance with
the law than a monetary penalty. The rent or productionof the land could pay the monetary
penalty of the AFIDA. On the other hand, with escheat the investment itself is gone.
158. IOWA CODE § 567.2(1) (1979).
159. Prior Iowa law provided "Nothing in this section shall prevent aliens from having
or acquiring property within the corporate limits of any city or town in the state. IOWA
STAT. ANN. § 567.1 (1946).
160. See note 249 infra.
161. See Letter from Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General of Oklahoma and John Paul
Johnson, Assistant Attorney General to Jay Casey (September 12, 1979) (unpublished opin-
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directly or indirectly acquire title to or own land in the state . 62
Aliens may hold property if they can demonstrate a bona fide resi-
dence in the state. 163 Upon termination of that residency, they
must dispose of the property. 164 If the land is improperly conveyed
to an alien investor, it escheats to the state. 165 Corporations fall
within the purview of the Oklahoma statutes, 166 and even incorpo-
ration within the state cannot circumvent the restrictions if the for-
eign portion of ownership is greater than the local ownership.' 67
The Attorney General's opinion represents a revival of en-
forcement of preexisting restrictions on foreign ownership.
168
Oklahoma law prevents foreign investors from acquiring agricul-
tural land, but carves out an exception for bona fide residents of
Oklahoma. The approach of Oklahoma hampers speculation in
land and protects local interests. Speculation is limited because the
residency requirement prevents foreigners located elsewhere from
purchasing and manipulating local land and land prices. By re-
quiring the owners to be bona-fide residents public pressures will
allow effective policing of the investor. The investor will be accessi-
ble, thus lessening the possibility land will be wasted, or other re-
lated harms will result. The investor is subject to the jurisdiction of
local courts as well. Local interests are protected by the residency
requirement because if the foreign investor leaves, there are limits
on alienation. 1
69
Corporations are governed by Oklahoma's foreign investment
law. 1 70  Foreigners unable to own agricultural land, who might
have sought to incorporate to circumvent Oklahoma law, find this
practice has been forbidden. Since corporations may only be
formed for "lawful purposes," 17 ' foreign corporations and foreign
individuals who incorporate in Oklahoma but are not bona fide res-
ion No. 79-286 of Attorney General) [hereinafter cited as Opinion of the Attorney General of
Oklahoma].
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 6.
168. See OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121 (1971).
169. Since aliens cannot acquire land unless bona fide residents, and those who terminate
their residency must alienate the land, a limited class of takers exist. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 121 (1971).
170. Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, supra note 161, at 4-7.
171. Id. at 5. In other words, foreign investors cannot do indirectly what they could not
do directly.
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idents will be prevented from owning agricultural land.'7 2
Oklahoma's provisions for escheat enhances the ability of the state
to enforce these provisions.
73
Although Iowa and Oklahoma are trendsetters, they certainly
are not alone in restricting foreign investment. Currently twenty-
five states restrict foreign investment in agricultural land to varying
degrees. 174 The major drawback of allowing foreign investment
questions to be controlled by the states is the lack of uniformity.'
75
To have effective regulation of foreign investment in agricultural
land, and remove internal inconsistencies, uniformity is needed.
Further, any new legislation in this area raises constitutional ques-
tions.
C. Constitutional Requirements
The United States Constitution is the fundamental law of the
land, and any law contravening it is void.' 76 The Constitution is
pertinent in this analysis for two reasons. First, state laws restrict-
ing foreign investment in agricultural land may impermissibly bur-
den commerce, infringe on foreign relations powers, or violate the
equal protection clause. Second, any attempt by the Federal Gov-
ernment at restricting foreign investment in agricultural land may
infringe on traditional state functions. Thus, laws regulating for-
eign rights to own real property pose novel, hybrid constitutional
issues.
1. Commerce Clause. Restrictive state laws prohibiting for-
eign investment in agricultural land are designed to protect the lo-
cal populace and economy. Although the immovable nature of real
property would seem to preclude it from being considered com-
merce, the fact that money products and profits "flow" interstate
has been construed as putting land transactions within the com-
merce power. 17 7 A recent United States Supreme Court case,
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 78 indicates that this sort of economic protec-
172. Unless they acquire during a bona fide residency. Id. at 5-7.
173. Id. at 8.
174. MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 15-19.
175. See Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L.
REV. 621, 624 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Morrison].
176. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803), Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304
(1816).
177. Morrison, supra note 175, at 650.
178. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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tion may represent an unreasonable burden on commerce. 179
When the Hughes test is applied to restrictive legislation, the
Court will look to: (1) Whether the statutes regulate evenhandedly,
with only incidental impacts on commerce, or if they discriminate
against commerce; (2) Whether the statutes serve a legitimate local
purpose; and if so, (3) Whether alternative means exist to promote
this local interest. 180
Applying the first prong of the Hughes test a discrimination
against commerce appears on the face of state statutes which re-
strict foreign investment in agricultural land. Investment from a
foreign source is denied entry to some states where domestic invest-
ment is not so restricted. This discrimination promotes local inter-
est to the exclusion of foreign investors. Even if the discrimination
is not a facial one, the impact will be discriminatory. 8'
The second part of the Hughes test favors restrictive state stat-
utes, as legitimate local interests include protecting family farmers,
keeping land prices under control, and insuring that agricultural
land is properly used. When the third prong of the Hughes test is
applied, restrictive state laws again encounter difficulty since sev-
eral alternatives exist to the current ad hoc approach to restricting
foreign investment in agricultural land. One alternative is uniform
federal legislation which either affirms the open door policy or to-
tally restricts foreign investment. Another alternative is a joint fed-
eral-state enforcement procedure. A joint regulation system would
require an initial testing of the proposed investment at the federal
level with a delegation of further regulation to the state level.
These alternatives would promote a systematic regulation of for-
eign investment and reduce the confusion created by different pol-
icy statements at various levels.
To sanction current state efforts is to create a "Balkaniza-
tion"' 11 2 of the economy that runs counter to the idea that the eco-
nomic unit of the nation is one. Domestic farmers should be
179. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
180. 441 U.S. at 336.
181. The level of Constitutional scrutiny is relevant. A barrier of strict scrutiny may be
more difficult to pass muster on than only a rational basis test. Morrison, supra note 175, at
642.
182. "Balkanization" is a term used to indicate the lack of uniformity that had plagued
the Colonies under the Articles of Confederation. The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to
insure uniformity, even when Congress has not spoken. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949).
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preferred 8 3 as apparently such is the developing international
trend. Indeed, modern international trends support this domestic
economic protectionism model, either by a model that totally pro-
hibits foreign investment, or by a model that allows it only upon a
careful review, but nevertheless on a uniform national basis.' 84
Thus, the commerce power could be a basis for federal legislation
aimed at reconciling policy conflicts.
2. Foreign Relations. State laws restricting foreign invest-
ment in agricultural land have aspects which interfere with the con-
duct of foreign relations. The foreign relations power is an
exclusive federal power precluding state action. 85 Because there is
a paucity of case law on whether restrictive state land laws infringe
on the foreign relations power, 186 some analogies to cases dealing
with inheritance laws may be useful.
Although it has been held that inheritance rights conditioned
on reciprocity were proper subjects of state regulation, there is au-
thority indicating the United States Supreme Court will scrutinize
any intrusion into foreign relations. When considering the "Iron
Curtain" inheritance laws,' 87 the Court in Zschernig v. Miller,
188
held state escheat provisions invaded foreign relations. 8 9 The Ore-
gon statute in Zschernig based inheritance rights on a preliminary
inquiry into foreign relations with the nation of the heir.' 9° As
such, if relations with the nation were not friendly, the property
escheated to the state. Conversely, if relations were friendly, the
rights of inheritance became perfected. It was this unconditional
and arbitrary exercise by the state of defining the current status of
foreign affairs that infringed on the exclusive federal right to define
and regulate foreign affairs. In a terse concurring opinion'9' it was
urged that any state action which interfered with foreign relations
183. "Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have access to every
market in the Nation .. ." 1d. at 539.
184. See Weisman, supra note 11, at 39-66.
185. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
186. See Morrison, supra note 175, at 646-50; MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at
28-29.
187. Such laws effectively excluded residents of "Iron Curtain" countries from inheri-
tance. A potential heir had to show that an American would have similar rights and the heir
would receive personally without confiscation. MORRISON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 28.
188. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
189. 389 U.S. at 441.
190. MORRIsON & KRAUSE, supra note 103, at 28.
191. 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart and Douglas concurring). The concurring opinion main-
Vol. 10
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must fall. 192
This line of reasoning can be extended to state restrictions on
foreign investment in agricultural land. On their face the state stat-
utes affect foreign relations by denying access to foreign investors
while the United States maintains an open door. Even if the stat-
utes survived because they did not single out one group of people,
as in Zschernig, the enforcement of the statutes may be such as to
pick out a group for special restrictive treatment.
Another federal power included as part of foreign relations is
the treaty power. The treaty power is an exclusive federal power;
states cannot make treaties. 9 3 Treaties are federal law and prevail
over conflicting state law,194 even when the state laws deal with
traditional state functions. 19' Restrictive state statutes, such as
Iowa's and Oklahoma's, appear on their face to be contrary to
OECD obligations and FCN treaties.
OECD signatories have agreed to gradually abolish restric-
tions on capital movement and encourage free trade. 196 State stat-
utes restricting foreign investment are contrary to this free trade
concept. Several nations have filed reservations under the OECD
prohibiting the outflow of domestic capital, however, these reserva-
tions by other nations in no way validate state restrictions.
Restrictive state statutes also conflict with FCN treaties by re-
stricting rather than encouraging commercial relations. ' 97 FCN
treaties regulate real property as well as commercial relations,
198
and although most FCN treaties do reserve the right to regulate
foreign ownership of real property to the United States, 99 such reg-
ulation generally refers to the ability of the federal government, not
the individual states, to restrict the ownership.2°
In the case of Lehndorff Geneva Inc. v. Warren,20 ' a Wisconsin
tained that foreign relations is an exclusive federal power and any state action that was
tantamount to foreign relations must fail,
192. The supremacy of Federal over state law is guaranteed. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
193. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
194. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
195. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (treaty), United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942) (executive agreement).
196. Hearings on HA 13128, supra note 45, at 81-82; Reverse Flow, supra note 119, at
579.
197. Reverse Flow, supra note 119, at 568.
198. See MORRISON & KRAusE, supra note 103, at 87-94.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 74 Wis.2d 369, 246 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
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court held that an FCN treaty with West Germany did not prevent
the state from prohibiting foreign investment in agricultural
land.20 2 The decision traced the history and logic of restrictive state
laws, and concluded that the purpose of restrictive state laws is in
keeping with United States reservations in FCN treaties.20 3 Fur-
ther, since FCN treaties are negotiated individually, the application
of state law to individual treaties will vary when the foreign pur-
chasers are from different nations.2°
Federal action is needed to remove questions raised by the
scope of the treaty power. A lack of guidelines has allowed the
following to happen: First, state land laws with restrictive provi-
sions conflict with the United States open door policy. Second, par-
ties to FCN treaties with the United States have, almost without
exception, imposed uniform restrictions on foreign investment.
The United States response to these restrictions is varied and con-
fusing. Federal action is needed to give these FCN treaties a pre-
dictable operation. Finally, federal action would give added
substance to treaties, and foreign nations would be able to give a
uniform and predictable operation to land regulation.
3. Equal Protection. Perhaps the most relevant constitutional
section in this analysis is the equal protection clause.20 5 The United
States Supreme Court has held that when a state law classifies2"6
individuals on the basis of their national origin, the strictest scru-
tiny possible will be applied.20 7 Conversely, when the classification
is made by the federal government, a lower level of scrutiny is re-
quired.2 °8
202. 246 N.W.2d at 818-19.
203. 246 N.W.2d at 819-24.
204. 246 N.W.2d at 818-19.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause has also been read as im-
plicit in the Fifth Amendment, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
206. Under equal protection analysis, classifications are based either on the interest in-
volved, for example voting rights, or the class involved, for example aliens. When an equal
protection analysis is then made either strict scrutiny, middle tier scrutiny, or rational basis
scrutiny is applied. Strict scrutiny generally means the classification in question will be vic-
torious, rational basis scrutiny meaning it will probably lose, the middle tier analysis is new
and applied to only a limited number of classes not of interest here, for example classifica-
tions based on gender.
207. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
208. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). The reason actions classifying
aliens by the federal government get a lower level of scrutiny in an equal protection analysis
is because federal authorities have plenary power over immigration and naturalization, thus
broader latitude is given their actions.
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With the above principles in mind it is apparent that state stat-
utes restricting foreign investment in agricultural land would re-
quire the strict scrutiny of recent Court decisions,2"9 and most likely
would be found invalid. However, state classifications based on
alienage do not warrant the level of scrutiny they have received
during the past decade. In Foley v. Connelie the Court stated that
the level of scrutiny of alienage classifications should not be so de-
manding where the matter falls within the states constitutional per-
ogative.2 1° As Foley recognized, local governments should be
granted more deference in determining whether aliens can hold
public policy making positions.21 ' Similarly, since land law is a
traditional state function,212 states should have more power in mak-
ing regulations.213
Federal authorities have the plenary power over the classifica-
tion of aliens,214 a power which could be used to inhibit foreign
investors from reaching agricultural land. If this were coupled with
a deference to state authorities to regulate foreign purchases, the
following could occur: Two levels of regulation of foreign invest-
ment could evolve. First, since federal authorities have a major in-
terest in regulating alienage matters, they could make an initial
determination of whether the proposed investment would benefit
the United States, taking into consideration special "local con-
cerns." 215 Second, should the federal government sanction such in-
vestment, the final decision of whether to permit foreign investment
would ultimately be one for the states.216
209. The Court has recently carved out an exception to strict scrutiny of state classifica-
tions for officers who participate in important public policy decisions. Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). These exceptions are not directly
applicable in foreign investment questions but the underlying rationale for the decisions may
prove useful.
210. See 435 U.S. at 301 (Blackmun J. concurring).
211. Id. at 297.
212. See section 11(b) supra.
213. Further, alienage classifications no longer warrant the strict scrutiny that has been
applied. First, the matters are usually within the perogatives of the state and deserve defer-
ence. Second, alienage is an alterable trait. Since aliens can become citizens, classifications
based on alienage are proper. Third, it takes little artful pleading on the part of attorneys to
find discrete and insular minorities in almost every aspect of modern American life, only
race should be deserving of a higher constitutional scrutiny. Finally, the Constitution itself
distinguishes between citizens and aliens. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J. dissenting).
214. See supra note 4.
215. To best reflect the local concerns the regulation would need some flexibility to pre-
serve local constitutional powers.
216. A carefully drawn federal statute would preclude any preemption problems posed
by Article VI of the Constitution.
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In the manner described above, the hybrid constitutional prob-
lem of regulating the purchase of real property by aliens would re-
ceive a response suitable to the respective sovereigns. A federal
response would act as a buffer to prevent investment that may be
disruptive to local concerns. A state response would allow a proper
amount of social experimentation. This appears to be in line with
recent international developments,2" 7 and within constitutional lim-
its.
Not all constitutional theories tip in favor of federal regula-
tion. The above powers and several others218 could serve as the
basis for a federal response to foreign investment in United States
agricultural land. However, the powers reserved to the states are
not to be overlooked in this analysis.219 A recent United States
Supreme Court decision, NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,22° indi-
cates that some vestiges of state power remain. The Constitution
recognizes that some powers are reserved for the states,22' and that
these powers prevent the federal government from interfering with
traditional state concerns. 222 In Usery, dicta indicated that limits
exist on the preemption power of Congress223 to prevent it from
acting in certain areas of state sovereignty. Further, in United
States v. Oregon,224 the Court recognized that real property regula-
tions were essentially a local concern beyond the purview of Con-
gress. 22' These traditional state powers are limited by the power of
Congress to enact appropriate legislation.226 But, nevertheless, any
federal regulation concerning the rights of individuals to own land
will come very close to interfering in an area of state power. The
result is a hybrid constitutional dilemma as traditional state and
federal powers come into direct conffict. Decisions regarding for-
217. See section III infra.
218. For example: national security U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, see Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Restrictive state statutes may likewise be
void because of a denial of due process. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
220. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
221. See supra note 219.
222. 426 U.S. at 845.
223. 426 U.S. at 851 n.16.
224. 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
225. 366 U.S. at 649-55.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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eign investment policy should not be committed to exclusively one
sovereign as long as more promising alternatives exist.
The current concern over foreign investment in agricultural
land has resulted in legal developments of a new nature. The fed-
eral government does not restrict foreign investment. Individual
states on the other hand have increasingly restricted foreign invest-
ment. The problem is complicated by the fact that both actions
appear to be within the constitutional perogatives of the individual
sovereigns.
Before final policy decisions are made, it will be instructive to
observe what is occurring in the international community. An in-
ternational trend is developing to restrict foreign investment in ag-
ricultural land. This trend is manifest in developed as well as
developing nations.227 In light of this trend, United States policy
decisions which make the most of state and local systems are sug-
gested.
III. INTERNATIONAL POLICY DECISIONS REGULATING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
Every government has the power to determine the extent to
which foreign investors may acquire rights in property within their
territory.228 Modern international practice is shifting towards pre-
ferring domestic over foreign investors.229 Before United States
policymakers decide how to regulate foreign purchases, an exami-
nation of developments in the international community is helpful.
A. Canada
Access to Canadian farmland is not on an open door basis.
23 °
In 1972, a Canadian government report revealed that foreign inves-
tors exercised more control over the Canadian economy than in any
other industrialized nation in the world.23' This report stimulated
the passage of restrictive laws aimed at halting the takeover of Ca-
nadian industry, and promoting local ownership.232
227. Note, Host Countries Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
233, 256 (1977).
228. See Weisman, supra note 11, at 39.
229. Id.
230. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 10.
231. See Comment, Foreign Investment Restrictions: Defending Economic Sovereignty in
Canada and.4ustralia, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 345 (1973). [hereinafter cited as Foreign Invest-
ment Restrictions].
232. CAN. STAT. of 1974, ch. 46 (1974).
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Canada has dealt with foreign investment by creating a two
tiered review system of incoming capital. The new Canadian law
sets up rigid screening procedures for foreign investors, and allows
foreign investment only if it is of "significant benefit to Canada. '2 33
Once the investment is determined to be of significant benefit, it is
subject to further and final regulation by the provinces. Although
the law was designed to regulate business, it could be applied to
farmland as well. Canada's policy regarding foreign investment in
farmland has been left to the provinces, but the nature and timing
of provincial laws indicates a coordination with the laws of the na-
tional government and an overall uniform system of regulation.
2 34
To form an impression of the extent and uniformity of Ca-
nada's restrictions it is instructive to observe the laws of the individ-
235ual provinces.
Prince Edward Island: Requires approval of the provincial gov-
ernment of sales to nonresidents of tracts larger than ten
acres or of more than 330 feet of shorefront.
Saskatechewan: The Farm Ownership Act of 1974 prohibits the
sale of realty valued at more than $15,000 to nonresidents.
Ontario: The Land Transfer Act of 1974 imposes a twenty per-
cent land transfer tax on acquisitions of land by nonresi-
dents of Canada. Nonresidents are required to pay a land
speculation tax and are barred from leasing Crown land as
summer resorts.
Alberta: The Recordation and Agricultural Act of 1977 allows
the exclusion of certain classes of people, most notably non-
resident aliens, from purchasing land.
Manitoba: Non-Canadian citizens may hold no more than 160
acres of land, nonfarmers no more than 640 acres.
British Columbia and Nova Scotia: Both have mildly restrictive
land laws.
It is interesting to compare some aspects of Canada's restrictive pol-
icies to the United States open door policy. First, both Canada and
the United States are signatories of the OECD, but Canada does
not adhere to it.236 Second, according to the GAO study, Canada
completed the second largest number of land transactions in the
United States of all nations, 237 yet effectively closed the door to
233. Id.
234. See Foreign Investment Restrictions, supra note 231.
235. The following description of Canadian laws was taken from SENATE COMMITrEE
PRINT, supra note 2, at 10; Hearings on HR 13128, supra note 45, at 87.
236. See Hearings on HR. 13128, supra note 45, at 83.
237. GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 20.
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United States investment. Finally, although the land laws of the
individual provinces may not work uniformly, coordination with
an overriding national statute helps deny access to foreign invest-
ment unless it benefits the Canadian economy. Thus, the two tiered
Canadian response provides scrutiny of the investment at two
levels. It not only allows the national government to review all in-
vestments, but it also allows for experimentation at the province
level, delegating to the provinces the power to restrict investment as
they deem best.
B. Mexico
Mexico also provides an interesting study in foreign invest-
ment law. Mexican law regulating foreign investment in agricul-
tural land is embodied in both the Mexican Federal Constitution
238
and recent statutory law.
239
As an initial burden, Mexico requires all foreign investors to
waive all protections of their home government. 2 ° Only Mexican
citizens by birth or naturalization may acquire an interest in Mexi-
can land.24' However, Mexico may grant land rights to foreigners,
provided they "agree to consider themselves nationals with regard
to such property and bind themselves not to invoke the protection
of their governments in matters related thereto. '24 2 The penalty for
noncompliance is forfeiture.243 This clause works as a disincentive
to foreign investors, as they are left without a remedy should the
Mexican government take their property by an arbitrary action.
Another major restriction imposed by Mexico is embodied in a
recent statute aimed at the promotion of Mexican investment and
the regulation of foreign investment in Mexican enterprises. 2" The
statute operates to limit foreign investment in several ways. First,
foreign investors are limited to a purchase of forty-nine percent of
the fixed assets of a corporation, or twenty five percent of the capi-
tal.245 If foreign investors seek to acquire a greater interest, prior
238. The following description of Mexican Laws was taken from SENATE COMMITTEE
PRINT, supra note 2, at 225-26.
239. Id. at 225.
240. Id. This is otherwise known as the Calvo clause.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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permission from the Mexican government is required.2" Second,
the statute provides an expansive definition of foreign investors.247
Third, the statute establishes seventeen factors which are to be con-
sidered in determining the extent and conditions for admitting for-
eign investment. 248 These factors are aimed at insuring that the
foreign investment will make a significant contribution to the Mexi-
can economy.
The Mexican model operates very much like the Canadian
model in restricting foreign investment. The methodology, how-
ever, is different. While Canada reviews investment meticulously
and subjects investment to several levels of review, Mexico imposes
administrative obstacles by broadly defining who a foreign investor
is, and as a condition precedent to investment, requires a waiver of
the protection of the home government. Investment is then allowed
to a limited degree and on conditions that will benefit Mexico.
Through these laws, Mexico too has formulated a uniform policy
restricting foreign investment in agricultural land.
C. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
In much the same way the United States controls grain pro-
duction, the OPEC nations have a virtual monopoly over petro-
leum products. As foreign investment in United States agricultural
land continues, some United States citizens envision "rich Arabs"
bidding up farmland prices with their newly found wealth and de-
stroying local markets.24 9 Another group maintains the amount of
OPEC investment is not significant enough to cause concern.25°
Two caveats are in order at this point. First, a lack of reliable in-
formation on foreign investment makes it difficult to determine the
amount of OPEC investment. Second, the threat perceived from
OPEC investment rests a good deal on racial, and recently, political
grounds.25 '
OPEC nations are, however, expanding investment in the




249. Waterloo, New Farm Sale Limits Aimed at Foreigners, Des Moines Register, May
13, 1979, at 47 col. 1.
250. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 282.
25 1. This is especially true in light of the recent Iranian crisis.
252. Member nations include: Venezuela, Indonesia, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Iran, and Libya. Increased investment is reflected in the ITA REPORT, supra note 3.
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their laws limit the ability of foreign investors to acquire real prop-
erty in their countries.
253
Qatar: Does not allow foreigners, be they national or juristic
persons, to acquire ownership of land or other real property.
Kuwait: Confines the right of owning real estate to Kuwait na-
tionals.
Iraq: The Iraq Constitution makes no allowance for real prop-
erty ownership by non-Iraquis, however, a 1961 statute rec-
ognized ownership of real property, except farmland, based
on reciprocity.
Libya: A foreigner needs the permisison of the Minister of Fi-
nance or Council of Ministers in order to acquire real prop-
erty, and if permission is granted, it is on Libyan terms.
United Arab Emirates: The Emirates impose several severe re-
gistration and restrictive features. Property ownership is
limited to nationals, but the nation's ruler may grant limited
rights to foreigners and impose any conditions he so
chooses.
The OPEC nations present a new restrictive model.2 5 1 Unlike the
review boards of Mexico and Canada, some OPEC nations abso-
lutely forbid foreign investment in real property.
D. Switzerland, The Andean Pact and Australia
The Swiss are yet another major investor in the United States
economy who have chosen to impose restrictions on foreign invest-
ment in their farmland.255 These restrictions include mandatory
permits to purchase real property25 6 as well as detailed licensing
requirements to acquire ownership of corporations. These restric-
tions focus on areas of the Swiss economy dependent on the tourist
trade.257 The Swiss claim these restrictions are only temporary, yet
they have been renewed annually since 1961 and are now in effect
until 1983.25 s
The signatories to the Andean Pact 259 have chosen to permit
foreign investment in agricultural land only so far as it benefits the
253. The following description of OPEC laws was taken from SENATE COMMITTEE
PRINT, snpra note 2, at 211-12.
254. See Weisman, supra note 1I, at 57.
255. The following description of Swiss laws was taken from SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT,
supra note 2, at 233-35.
256. Id. at 234.
257. Id. at 234-35.
258. Id.
259. Parties to the Andean Pact include: Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela.
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region.2 60 The policy of the Andean Pact is to prefer local capital
and allow foreign investment only if it will provide a positive con-
tribution.2 6' Foreign investment must be authorized by parties to
the Pact, and will be denied if the activity is adequately covered by
existing enterprises or if the purpose of the investment is to acquire
shares, participation, or rights owned by nationals.2 6' The Pact also
limits repatriation of profits, realizing that such profits are more
valuable if left in the area than if they are taken elsewhere.263 Re-
investment is encouraged, but it must be registered, and in some
cases it may have to go through a full detailed authorization proc-
ess. 2 6
4
The Pact also gives preferential tariff treatment to signatories
and nationals.265 Purchase or authorization of foreign technology
is not allowed if the net result is to cause an inflow of goods from
out of the region,266 or if the seller reserves the right to fix the price
of goods produced from such technology,2 67 or if the technology
tends to restrict subregional development or inhibit price competi-
tion.268 Absolute restrictions on foreign investment exist in a few
sectors, 269 and although the Pact does defer to member nations cre-
ating their own areas of special interest, 270 in essence the Pact fa-
vors local interests and discriminates against foreign investment.
Traditionally the Australians have maintained an open door to
foreign investors. However, a devalued Australian dollar and an
extremely large inflow of foreign capital in the early 1970's caused
the Australians to reconsider their foreign investment policy, result-
ing in the enactment of measures limiting foreign investment.27'
The Australian policy is apparently aimed at preventing foreign ac-
quisitions contrary to the national interest.27 2 Though these regula-
tions are primarily directed at business entities, the purpose is to
260. Properly known as THE ANDEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODE, reprinted in I I INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 126 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THE CODE]. For background see Daftino, The
Andean Code Five Years After, 8 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 635 (1976).
261. THE CODE, supra note 260, at 126-27.
262. Id. at 129-30.
263. 1d. Cf note 94 supra.
264. Id. at 132.
265. Id. at 135.




270. Id. Also representing a trend toward regional groupings are the EEC and AnCom.
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protect strategic industries,2 7 3 and farmland could fall into that cat-
egory. Though Australian standards and criteria may be broad and
vague, they have joined those nations which have taken a restrictive
stance towards foreign investment in agriculture.
There appears to be a developing international trend towards
restricting foreign investment in agricultural land. Representative
nations employ different methodologies for restricting such invest-
ment, with some nations choosing to prohibit foreign investment,
and others allowing it based on the decision of a review board. In-
ternationally, the United States fits neither model.
As the United States moves toward broader restrictions on for-
eign investment it is essential to keep in mind international devel-
opments. When reconciling the laws of the federal government,
individual states, and the Constitution, these international develop-
ments can be very instructive.
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES
The United States has several alternatives in choosing to re-
strict foreign investment. These alternatives can make the most of
international trends, and at the same time, minimize the harm to
the state and federal relationships.
The first alternative is federal regulation restricting foreign in-
vestment in agricultural land. Although arguably within the power
of Congress to do so, such action would have severe political and
constitutional repercussions. The states would be offended as they
would be deprived of a traditional sovereign power. Further, fed-
eral regulation might require an immense bureaucracy for effective
enforcement. There would also be major questions regarding the
extent to which federal law preempts state law and the powers, if
any, that remained in the states. Total federal regulation of foreign
investment in United States agricultural land thus becomes the
least favored alternative.274
A second alternative is do nothing and leave the law as it is
now. This would leave land law to the states, thus preserving their
right to social experimentation. This in turn would perpetuate the
current lack of uniformity of regulations, perhaps leading to a re-
trenchment of the haphazard and ineffective methods of regulating
foreign investment. There also exists the possibility of concentra-
273. Id.
274. The Agricultural Foreign Investment Control Act of 1979, S. 194, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. was introduced to limit acquisitions of agricultural land.
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tion of foreign investment. Although perhaps curable by later state
legislation, the alternative of doing nothing does not appear attrac-
tive.275
The best alternative is a mixed federal-state system regulating
foreign investment in agricultural land. This system could be pat-
terned after the Canadian model and effectively implement both
federal and state law. The model would operate something like
this.
Foreign investors would initially present their intention to in-
vest to a federal agency that would determine whether the invest-
ment would benefit the United States economy. The decision to
allow such investment would rest on factors such as the size of the
investment, its location, and the potential harmful effect of the in-
vestment on the local area. These decisions could be effectively co-
ordinated with the lISA and the FISA to determine the potential
impact. Severe penalties, such as escheat, would be required for
those not complying with the initial screening procedure.
Once the investment has been ruled upon by a national board,
it would be subject to local restrictions. At the state level, any re-
strictions or invitations which the individual states felt were neces-
sary could be made. Thus, traditional regulation of land law by the
States would go unharmed and a broader degree of social experi-
mentation would exist.
On the national level, the door would remain open to foreign
investors; local interest would be served first, and the welfare of
foreign investors would be a secondary concern. This discretionary
admission of foreign investors would effectively safeguard the do-
mestic investor, while creating enough redtape to discourage some
foreign investment. States would then be able to control foreign
investment in whichever way they deemed proper, and protection
from disruptive investment would be vested in the national govern-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION
United States policy toward foreign investment in agricultural
land is in a state of confusion. The national policy has few restric-
tions, while individual states restrict foreign investment in numer-
ous ways. Interestingly, neither state nor national governments
275. This approach would merely perpetuate the somewhat hypocritical open door pol-
icy promises of the federal government who then delegate the restrictive policy options to the
states. SENATE COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 2, at 37-38.
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possess recording statutes that provide consistently accurate data
disclosing the extent and impact of foreign investment.
Foreign investors have easy access to United States markets
and several motives for investing in United States agricultural land.
As a result, there has been a large influx of foreign investment
which is potentially disruptive to the United States economy. In
light of these potential dangers, the United States needs to clarify
conflicting state and federal policies.
The United States, by choosing not to restrict foreign invest-
ment in agricultural land, is an international anomaly. There pres-
ently exists an international trend toward restricting foreign
investment in agricultural land. As the United States considers
joining this restrictive trend, there are several approaches available.
Although current regulations are adequate, a far better alternative
would be to create a two-tiered review system. At one level, federal
regulations would determine whether the investment could benefit
the United States economy. If the investment was approved by the
federal review agency, it would be subject to local restrictions. This
review system would allow for both state and federal review and
regulation.
The open door policy formulated by Alexander Hamilton was
well suited to the United States of 1776.276 However, the interven-
ing years have altered the needs of the country, and the United
States in 1980 no longer needs to extend broad invitations to for-
eign investment. Indeed, in light of international trends and devel-
opments, a discretionary policy of allowing foreign investment is
desirable. In that way, domestic investors maintain a preferred sta-
tus, while all other investment is rigidly screened. Under this sys-
tem, the United States will be able to pick that investment which is
of the most benefit. In light of international trends restricting for-
eign investment in agricultural land, the United States would be
well advised to push the barn door shut.
Terry L Schmidt
276. See supra note 1.
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